Abstract. Building on previous work of Tait, Koellner, and myself exploring the question of which reflection principles are intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set, we formulate a new reflection principle, which subsumes all previously known reflection principles which have been proposed as intrinsically justified and are also known to be consistent, and which is itself consistent relative to an ω-Erdös
William Tait has explored the question of the extent of large-cardinal axioms that are intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set, in [2] . He proposed a family of reflection principles but unfortunately Peter Koellner proved that some of these were inconsistent, in [3] . The rest were shown to be consistent relative to an ω-Erdös cardinal. Peter Koellner also later proposed some related reflection principles which he could show were consistent relative to an ω-Erdös cardinal, in [4] . Then I proposed a family of reflection principles in [6] which could be used to prove all of the reflection principles discussed by Tait and Koellner which were consistent, and proved that these were also consistent relative to an ω-Erdös cardinal. I also proposed that they should be considered to be intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set, and suggested principled reasons for why the reflection principles of Tait that had been found to be inconsistent should not have been regarded as justified (even before their inconsistency had been discovered). Here I formulate a new reflection principle which subsumes all of the consistent reflection principles discussed in the previously mentioned work of Tait, Koellner, and myself. I prove that this reflection principle is consistent relative to an ω-Erdös cardinal and suggest that this reflection principle too should be considered to be intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set. Furthermore I tentatively suggest that an open-ended family
of strengthenings of this principle, based on strengthenings of the underlying language, should be considered to exhaust all of the reflection principles which are intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set. If we restrict ourselves to countable languages such that if we assume that κ(ω) exists then we can give a semantics for the language with the domain of discourse of the set variables resticted to V κ(ω) , then all of the resulting reflection principles are provably consistent relative to κ(ω). This includes principles which are strong enough to justify the existence of remarkable cardinals.
We begin by presenting the new reflection principle.
Definition 0.1. Suppose that κ is a cardinal with the following property. For any finite list of parameters a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n , there exists an ordinal λ < κ and two sets M, N which are models of ZFC, such that V λ ∪ {V λ } ⊆ M and M, N are both elementary substructures of V , and a nontrivial elementary embedding j : M ≺ N with critical point λ such that j(λ) = κ, with a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n ∈ range j. If κ has this property then κ is said to be an extremely reflective cardinal.
It is clear that this reflection principle subsumes all the ones considered in [2] , [4] , and [6] , and it is also easy to see that ZFC+"there is a proper class of extremely reflective cardinals" is consistent relative to ZFC+"there is an ω-Erdös cardinal". We argue this point as follows.
Theorem 0.2. The theory ZFC+"there is a proper class of extremely relective cardinals" is interpretable in ZFC+"there is an ω-Erdös cardinal".
Proof. Let {ι 1 , ι 2 , . . .} be a sequence of Silver indiscernibles, for the language of set theory with a truth predicate, for V κ(ω) . Fix a finite set of parameters a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n . By indiscernibility for the language of set theory, we can find a finite set of parameters b 1 , b 2 , . . . b n such that the same set of formulas in the language of set theory whose free variables are exactly x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , . . . x n are true at ι 1 , b 1 , b 2 , . . . b n as are true at ι 2 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n . Now, the the Skolem hull M in V κ(ω) , (for some fixed family of Skolem functions, just for the language of set theory), of V ι 1 ∪ {ι 2 , a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n , b 1 , b 2 , . . . b n } is a model of ZFC which is an elementary substructure of V κ(ω) , and we can define an elementary embedding j : M ≺ M with critical point ι 1 such that j(ι 1 ) = ι 2 , j(b i ) = a i for i = 1, 2, . . . n. In this way we witness the extreme reflectiveness of ι 2 , and therefore (by indiscernibility for the language of set theory with a truth predicate), for all the ι i for each i ∈ ω. Now, we know that the sequence of Silver indescribles can be chosen to lie in any given closed unbounded set of κ(ω), so it follows that the set of extremely reflective cardinals less than κ(ω) is a stationary subset of κ(ω). Thus, V κ(ω) is a model of ZFC+"there is a proper class of extremely reflective cardinals". This completes the argument.
In order to strengthen this reflection principle, we simply need to strengthen the language for which j is an elementary embedding. For example, we might strengthen it to languages obtained from the firstorder language of set theory by transfinite iteration of the process of adding truth predicates to the language. If we perform this process just once, adding a truth predicate for the first-order language of set theory to the first-order language of set theory and requiring that j should be an elementary embedding for that language, then it is easy to see that postulating a proper class of cardinals satisfying the resulting reflection principle, together with the Tarski axioms for the truth predicate and separation and replacement axioms for formulas in the extended language, is sufficient for proving the existence of a proper class of remarkable cardinals.
As long as we use a countable language, such that if we assume that κ(ω) exists then we can give a semantics for the language where the domain of discourse of the set variables is V κ(ω) , then the resulting reflection principle will still be consistent relative to an ω-Erdös cardinal. We might be tempted to suppose that using uncountable languages could help us to break the κ(ω) barrier, but reflection on the properties of ω-Erdös cardinals shows that this is not so: for any language of cardinality less than κ(ω) with a structure with universe V κ(ω) as the intended interpretation, there will still be a set of indiscernibles of order type ω for the language.
We will make some remarks below in defence of the idea that as long as we can recognise a language as being a meaningful language for describing properties of V , then the corresponding reflection principle should be considered to be intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set. We further tentatively suggest that every statement that is intrinsically justifiable on the basis of the iterative conception of set can be derived from a reflection principle of this form.
Next, we should say a few words about why the notion of an extremely reflective cardinal should be considered to be intrinsically justified on the basis of the iterative conception of set. Roughly the idea is as follows. We fix a particular set V κ which is so large that it can be regarded as a candidate for V . Any properties of V κ which are expressible by reference to the ambient universe V should already be reflected down to some smaller ordinal λ. In particular this includes properties which are expressible by means of reference to some finite sequence of parameters from the ambient universe V . There should be a smaller ordinal λ such that the transitive collapse of the Skolem hull of V λ ∪ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n } should admit an elementary embedding into the Skolem hull of V κ ∪ {a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n } with critical point λ and j(λ) = κ and a 1 , a 2 , . . . a n in the range of j. These ideas are similar to those used to justify the hyperreflective cardinals of [6] .
Peter Koellner has expressed some interesting criticisms of the idea that higher-order reflection principles can be intrinsically justified. He distinguishes between an "actualist" and a "potentialist" conception of the universe V , and suggests that on the "actualist" conception the idea of higher-order properties of V cannot be made meaningful, whereas on the "potentialist" conception only a limited amount of reflection can be justified because of the need for systematic ambiguity in what our ambient universe V is. (In fact, he suggests that only enough reflection can be justified to give Σ 1 -replacement, so in particular not even all of ZFC is justified.) We would like to suggest that this objection can be overcome by means of ideas along the lines of those suggested in [2] , involving what Peter Koellner refers to as the Relativised Cantorian Principle.
Cantor wrote that if an initial segment of the sequence of ordinals is only a set then it has a least strict upper bound. The phrase "is only a set" can be replaced with other conditions for the existence of a least strict upper bound, and for any given set of conditions it then becomes plausible to postulate the existence of a level of the universe which is a closure point for the process of obtaining new ordinals in this way. For example, the existence of a Π 1 1 -indescribable cardinal (equivalently, a weakly compact cardinal) can be motivated by the idea that if a level of the universe is Π 1 1 -describable then it cannot be all of V , and so this is a reasonable condition for the existence of a least strict upper bound of all the ordinals obtained so far, and it is reasonable to postulate the existence of a level of the universe which is a closure point for the process of obtaining new ordinals in this way. Peter Koellner's objection to the Relativised Cantorian Principle is that it proves too much. For example, why should we not regard it as reasonable to postulate a closure point for the process of moving on to a new ordinal whenever the least strict upper bound of all the ordinals we have constructed so far is not a supercompact cardinal? The idea here is that, in the case of the motivation for a weakly compact cardinal given before, we are dealing with a limited set of processes for building up new ordinals based on a certain limited set of circumstances under which we can say that we have warrant for concluding that the level of the universe we have built up so far is not all of V , which is not the case with Peter Koellner's example of an obviously inadequate justification for a supercompact cardinal. Of course we always know that at any given stage the level of the universe we have obtained so far is not all of V , or it would not be meaningful to speak of its higher-order properties at all. But we only actually pass on to a higher ordinal under a certain circumscribed set of circumstances under which we know that we have warrant for saying that the level obtained so far is not all of V , where we can tell this simply by looking at the properties of the level we have built up so far (possibly together with some parameters from the ambient universe), and we do not merely infer it from the fact that we obtained it as a limit of a class of ordinals built up using a narrowly circumscribed range of procedures.
The other issue is whether we have principled grounds for refusing to accept those reflection principles of Tait which Peter Koellner proved to be inconsistent. In [6] I suggested a possible principled ground. Just as Tait appealed to the idea that the inclusion map of a structure (V β , V β+1 , ǫ) into a structure (V κ , V κ+1 , ǫ) is not single-valued when β < κ as a motivation for refusing to accept a "naive" form of third-order reflection which is easily proved to be inconsistent, so we can appeal to the idea that the Skolem functions witnessing the truth of a higherorder formula in V κ may cease to be single-valued when we reflect down to V β to motivate refusing to accept those reflection principles of Tait which Peter Koellner proved to be inconsistent. But on the other hand this still allows for plausible motivations to be given for the reflection principles discussed in [6] and the present paper.
In [3] Peter Koellner suggested a motivation for a principle which he called EP, which says that there is a proper class C of cardinals such that given any pair of distinct cardinals κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ C with κ 1 < κ 2 , the structure L(V κ 1 ) is elementarily embeddable into L(V κ 2 ). It is equivalent to the closure of V under sharps. It is of some interest to see what blocks us from formalising this intuitive argument in ZFC+"there is a proper class of extremely reflective cardinals". It is easy to see that given any extremely reflective cardinal κ, we can prove for all cardinals λ > κ that there is a subset C of κ cofinal in κ such that for any pair of distinct ordinals κ 1 , κ 2 ∈ C with κ 1 < κ 2 , the structure L λ (V κ 1 ) is elementarily embeddable into L λ (V κ 2 ). But we cannot infer from this that the same choice of cofinal subset C will work for all cardinals λ > κ, for this would be a quantifier shift fallacy. This blocks us from inferring that V κ is closed under sharps for all extremely reflective cardinals κ, and so blocks the derivation of Koellner's principle EP. This would seem to support the view that Koellner's principle EP is derived from a "resemblance principle" rather than a reflection principle.
